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Abstract 
Late antiquity is a sub-discipline of History. It is also a particular way of representing the 
time and space of the past. Studies in late antiquity tend to focus on the culture and society of 
the late Roman world. This article argues that this way of imagining time and space and 
people derives from Francophone debates about colonial governance that were current in the 
1920s and 1930s. This colonial humanism provided the context for two Francophone authors 
whose work heavily influenced the formation of Late Antiquity: Fernand Braudel and Henri 
Marrou. This article shows how Braudel and Marrou were influenced by colonial humanism 
and how this influence shaped the formation of late antiquity. Historiographical accounts of 
the study of late antiquity have noted a recurring preoccupation with modernity. This article 
argues that late antiquity is modern to the extent that it is dependent on the colony for its 
constitution.  
Introduction 
Stories about past times are also stories about space, about where boundaries are drawn, and 
how the world might be imagined. Around 1940, as he was writing the preface to his first 
monograph, Santo Mazzarino, a historian of the late Roman world, reflected on his 
relationship to previous generations of scholarship. Enlightenment historians like Edward 
Gibbon had argued that the end of Roman power could best be described as a product of 
imperial decadence. For Mazzarino, however, this was no longer a tenable explanation. 
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Indeed, he noted, this account of decadent decline seemed ‘to us moderns, impossible, and 
therefore an analytical revision is required of the various problems which that history raises 
[...] and of the limits that it may imply’ (Mazzarino 1942: i; Testa 2017: xi-xii). This preface 
captures a wider shift that was then unfolding in the way that historians analysed the history 
of the later Roman Empire. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the consensus was that 
the end of the Roman Empire and the origin of the middle ages could best be interpreted as a 
story of decadence and collapse. This had consequences for how historians split the past into 
historical periods. In the 1880s, for example, Theodor Mommsen concluded his lectures on 
Roman history with the sack of Rome by the Goths in 410CE (Testa 2017: x). It seemed that 
after this event, reported catastrophically in the written sources, one ought to draw down a 
tasteful scholarly curtain and wait for the Middle Ages to arrive.  
This paradigm of decadence and catastrophic collapse was challenged by Alois Riegl at the 
turn of the twentieth century. In his Spätrömische Kunstindustrie (1901), Riegl showed that 
the period between the death of Constantine (337) and the crowning of Charlemagne as 
Emperor (800) was one of considerable aesthetic innovation, catalysed by a transformation in 
the ways that human beings saw and understood the world (Riegl [1901] 1985). After the 
1930s and 1940s – the generation of scholarship represented by Mazzarino – it became more 
and more common for historians and philologists to approach the era between the third and 
eighth centuries as a distinct period. No longer considered merely the decayed ruins of the 
classical world, this period was now approached as worthy of study and one which should be 
analysed on its own terms. This shift in scholarship is echoed in more recent studies. For 
example, an introduction to a 1999 collection of essays argued that ‘[t]he time has come for 
scholars, students, and the educated public in general to treat the period between around 250 
and 880CE as a distinctive and quite decisive period that stands on its own’ (Bowersock, 
Brown, and Grabar 1999: ix; Marcone 2008: 5), while another concludes that ‘the “decline” 
explanation appears outmoded’ (Cameron 1993, 198). Dividing the past up into periods is 
always an exercise in ascribing value to things; as historians rejected the utility of decadence 
or decline as an explanatory factor, so they redrew the boundaries of their periodization. 
Late antiquity is the name given in English to this period, stretching from the mid-third 
century to the reign of Charlemagne. In Anglo-American scholarship, the identification of 
late antiquity as a specific period was the collective work of a generation of scholars who 
came of age in the 1960s. In his 1971 book The World of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown set out 
the geographical scope of this new period:  
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‘We live round a sea,’ Socrates had told his Athenian friends, ‘like frogs round a 
pond.’ Seven hundred years later, in AD 200, the classical world remained clustered 
around its pond: it still clung to the shores of the Mediterranean. (Brown 1971: 11) 
Later on in life, Brown observed that the identification of ‘late antiquity’ in his own work 
was caused by a shift in geographical perspective: in the 1960s he had been a historian of the 
western half of the late Roman Empire but towards the end of that decade he turned to the 
eastern Mediterranean, focusing on sources written in Greek and Syriac. As it emerged in 
Anglophone scholarship, and particularly in Brown’s work, the geographic scope of late 
antiquity was the territory occupied by the Roman Empire, with a specific interest in Africa 
and the Middle East. Late antiquity is a particular period, defined by temporal limits, but, 
when Brown first spoke of it in the early 1970s, it was also a particular space: the 
Mediterranean basin, North Africa, and the Middle East. 
As well as naming a particular time and a particular space, studies in late antiquity also 
developed a coherent set of methodological predispositions. As many have noted, chief 
among these is a turn towards the social life of human beings as it was captured in 
hagiography, in sermons, in material culture, or in art. Religion is understood as part of this 
life; it is approached and defined as a manifestation of social tensions and anxieties that 
played out across the Mediterranean. Part of what helped Late Antiquity to emerge as a 
cohesive discipline is a sense that, across the time and space, this late antique world was ‘held 
together’ by a common culture (Brown 1983: 1). Studies in late antiquity, as they emerged in 
Anglophone scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s, accessed sources in new ways, reading them 
with innovative methods, to understand the social and cultural life that bound together the 
humans around the edges of the Mediterranean. The term ‘late antiquity’ denotes a particular 
time, a particular place, and a particular way of knowing and imagining the people who lived 
in that time and place. 
As one commentator has noted, this study of the later Roman Empire has been ‘dominated’ 
by the work of Peter Brown (Markus 2009: 2). Beginning in the 1960s with studies of Roman 
Africa and Italy, Brown combined two historiographical traditions (Brown 1961b; 1961a). 
The first was an Anglophone focus on the social and economic trajectories of the late Roman 
world, exemplified in the work of A. H. M. Jones and Michael Rostovzeff. This was 
complemented by a deep knowledge of the French scholarship on the early history of the 
Church and post-1945 philological studies of Latin (Markus 2009: 5; Wood 2013: 306–307). 
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The cultural and intellectual history pioneered by his teacher, Arnaldo Momigliano, was also 
a significant influence on his work. Brown was able to situate familiar figures like Augustine 
of Hippo within a much richer account of the social and cultural life of the late Roman 
Empire. The study of late antiquity remains heavily focussed around Brown’s 
‘preoccupations: the body and society, asceticism, sexuality, the evolution of Christian 
sensibilities, the exercise in authority within Christian Roman society […] and death and the 
other world’ (Markus 2009, 12). 
Brown has discussed the development of his model of late antiquity in a number of places 
(Brown 1988, 1997, 2003). He has shown how this rendering of the late Roman world 
emerged as a result of reading the preceding generation of scholarship, the work produced by 
Mazzarino and his peers. Chief among the influences that Brown names are Fernand 
Braudel’s La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (1949) and a 
collection of texts by the French historian Henri Marrou, including the ‘Retractatio’ he 
published in his 1949 edition of Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique and his Histoire 
de l’éducation dans l’Antiquité (1948). These studies, published in the years after the Second 
World War, provided Brown with the imaginative raw materials to rework the history of the 
late Roman world into an account of late antiquity, something at once so alien and so 
familiar.  
In the introduction to his 1971 book The World of Late Antiquity, Peter Brown places the 
historian’s imagination as a central concern of this new World he’s unfolding before them.  
 […] the writings of men like Plotinus and Augustine surprise us, as we catch strains – 
as in some unaccustomed overture – of so much that a sensitive European has come to 
regard as most ‘modern’ and valuable in his own culture (Brown 1971: 7).  
The quotation marks around the word ‘modern’ are striking. This punctuation serves to draw 
the reader’s attention to this word but also to render its meaning more obscure (Cooper 2005: 
113). Do the quotation marks indicate that the ‘modern’ is not really modern, but simply the 
Late Antique living in the present? Are they supposed to lend the sentence a sense of irony, 
undermining the word ‘valuable’ that follows closely behind? Do they indicate a technical 
term-of-art, making a connection to musical modernism evoked by the ‘unaccustomed 
overture’?  Or, and this is the position adopted in this paper, perhaps these quotation marks 
serve to draw our attention away from things in this text that are uncomfortable or dangerous. 
For there are two words in this passage that are also very important for Brown’s analysis of 
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late antiquity, and those two words are: ‘European’ and ‘culture’. Perhaps these quotation 
marks are symptoms of something repressed that nevertheless makes itself present in 
Brown’s writing and the historian’s imagination. 
This article argues that ‘late antiquity’ as it emerges in Anglo-American scholarship of the 
1970s and 1980s replicates ways of thinking about time, space, and human beings that were 
current in the French Third Republic. Late antiquity is a way of thinking about time, 
particularly the relationship between the Roman world and the modern. It’s a way of thinking 
about space, particularly the space of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. 
And it’s a way of knowing other human beings, particularly through their culture. This 
division of time and space, together with the focus of culture, is also present in the 
development of colonial humanism in France after the First World War. The article argues 
that this is not a coincidence, but derives from the reception of French scholarship by 
English-speaking historians. In particular, Fernand Braudel and Henri Marrou have both been 
identified as having critical and formative influences on the work of Peter Brown. These two 
French historians were themselves shaped by their experiences as French men between the 
two world wars. Similarities between colonial humanism and late antiquity are not accidental. 
Rather, they indicate a fundamental isomorphism that lies unacknowledged but detectable in 
the marks it leaves around the word ‘modern’. 
To make this argument, I’m going to move through three stages. First, I open the argument 
by considering the different ways in which historians imagine the past, focussing on how the 
past might be figured as present when historians do History. I integrate this analysis into an 
account of French colonialism in the 1930s, particularly the connection between imperialism 
and knowledge production that came to be called colonial humanism. In this particular 
historical context, a specific definition of modernity was deployed to order and know the 
subjects of the French empire; to speak of modernity at this moment therefore also meant 
speaking of coloniality. In the second section, I show how Brown took from Braudel a deep 
appreciation of the role of the Mediterranean as a bridge between Africa and Europe. I argue 
that this geographical imagination was part of a wider way of conceptualising the space and 
time of the French empire. In the final section, I turn to the work of Henri Marrou. I show 
how Brown took from Marrou a particular understanding of culture and education that 
heavily influenced his work. I then argue that Marrou’s model of culture was developed in 
the midst of wider debates about culture, civilizational collapse, and colonialism that moved 
through France in the 1920s and early 1930s. Braudel and Marrou gave Brown the 
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intellectual raw materials to imagine the time, space, and people of the late antique world. 
This was, however, an imagination shaped by the colonial modernity of the Third Republic. 
Modern: History as present and ‘colonial humanism’ 
Dividing the past into periods is a work of the imagination. It is a way for historians to make 
sense and give meaning to the past as they encounter it. As he glanced back over preceding 
scholarship, Mazzarino argued that the Enlightenment model of decadent decline was no 
longer acceptable to ‘to us moderns’ [a noi moderni] (Mazzarino 1942: i). Echoing 
Mazzarino’s words, one commentator has argued that the development of late antiquity has 
been animated by a ‘rhetoric of modernity’ (Giardina 2013: 3): the circumscription and 
identification of late antiquity goes hand-in-hand with wider claims about the nature of 
modernity. This is certainly an astute observation. Alois Riegl’s analysis of late Roman 
material culture, for example, situated itself alongside two aspects of contemporary Viennese 
culture: the institutional growth of museums in the city and the wider political and aesthetic 
shifts ushered in by the avant garde (Cordileone 2014: 10–12). Riegl’s work was also the 
product of the imperial ambitions of Austria-Hungary (Elsner 2002; Olin 1994). Similarly, 
the focus on cultural change and slow transformation that is a recurring theme of Anglo-
American treatments of late antiquity has been connected to wider twentieth-century 
anxieties about crisis and catastrophe (Marcone 2008). It is ‘a strikingly optimistic reading of 
the period’ (Wood 2013: 309). Some studies have argued that the focus on commonalities of 
culture reproduces a commitment to multiculturalism in the liberal, Western academy (James 
2008; Liebeschuetz 2001b, 2001a, 2003). In each of these cases, the nature of modernity, its 
location, and its historical development is conceptualised differently; each offers a particular 
way of representing the past and of explaining the relationship between that past and the 
present (Cooper 2005: 149). This seems to be a particularly strong strain in the historiography 
of late antiquity: ‘[i]f all history is contemporary history, this is currently true of one history 
in particular, namely that of Late Antiquity’ (Giardina 2013: 4). Attempts to represent and 
understand the end of the Roman Empire are therefore intertwined with questions about what 
it means to be modern. 
To study late antiquity is to study the imaginative world of people in the distant past, but it is 
also to think about how that past is imagined by historians. Towards the end of his essay, 
‘Nietzche-Genealogy-History,’ Michel Foucault remarks that the nineteenth-century 
experience of ruin-gazing led to the emergence (Entstehung) of History as a discipline: ‘cities 
in ruin and enigmatic monuments are spread out before us; we stop before gaping walls; we 
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ask what gods inhabited these empty temples’ (Foucault 1977: 92).2 Writing around the same 
time, the great historian Arnaldo Momigliano wrote that, ‘[f]rom the eighteenth century 
onward we have been obsessed with the Fall of the Roman Empire: this fall has become the 
archetype of every decline and, therefore, the symbol of our fears’ (Marcone 2008: 7–8). As 
Foucault and Momigliano both recognised, the study of history is governed and shaped by the 
anxieties of the historian (Foucault 1977: 76–77). 
The question of how the past remains or becomes present has influenced recent studies of 
historical theory that have challenged or sought to nuance the representational turn in 
historical studies inaugurated by Hayden White’s Metahistory (Icke 2011: 131). Eelco Runia 
has adapted the concept of parallel processing to describe how the past becomes present in 
the work of historians. Parallel processing is a term used in psychotherapy training to 
describe a moment when processes that emerged in meetings between a therapist and client 
are displaced in to the meetings with the therapist and her supervisor (Runia 2014: 20–23). 
Runia argues that the work of historians can become animated by a similar dynamic; 
historians can ‘repeat the problems’ they are studying, as Dominic LaCapra has put it (2001: 
142).  
Runia’s example of this process is the large report produced by Dutch historians in the wake 
of the Srebrenica genocide in July 1995. In his analysis, this report repeated both the wider 
anxieties within Dutch society around the role of the Dutch military in the massacre and the 
tensions between different parts of the Dutch establishment (the civil service, the military, the 
media, the government) (Runia 2014: 27–34). The official report that historians produced to 
analyse Dutch actions in the time before and during the events of summer 1995 was, in 
Runia’s words, ‘a genuine, local, and comprehensive […] manifestation of unconscious 
identification processes’ (Runia 2014: 46). In its refusal to reach a clear account of events, 
the report repeated the widespread confusion caused by Srebrenica in Dutch society. 
Moreover, argued Runia, the manner in which the historians had conducted their 
investigation also replicated the experiences of the soldiers they were studying; the historians 
considered themselves a lone outpost, the guardians of the society in which their small group 
was located. Contemporary anxieties caused by the massacre and the role of the Dutch 
soldiers are displaced into the study of the historians. Historians work with the imagination, 
but that imagination is trammelled by its own fears, projections, and refusals. 
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Edensor 2012: 2; Hell 2009: 291). 
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Runia and Foucault share a sense that written history functions to occlude the material and 
power relationships that drive change in human societies. The realism of historical narrative 
disguises its nature as a representation of the world. Although ‘History, with a capital H, […] 
cannot tolerate otherness or leave it outside its economy of inclusion’ (Young 1990: 5), the 
smooth totality of historical narration is disrupted by those moments in which the past refuses 
to be disciplined. There is a similarity here to the modernist novel as it emerged in the 
decades before the First World War. In these novels, as Frederic Jameson has shown, 
descriptions of travel infrastructure (railways, roads) are important parts of the establishment 
of verisimilitude, but they also indicate a world beyond the space narrated by the novel 
(Jameson 1990: 52–53). The train track continues to an unknown station; the road winds into 
the distance. In Jameson’s reading, these elements in the text point to a wider transformation 
in the European societies which produced the novels. That is, the realist descriptions of space 
in these novels are determined by a wider shift in the spatial organisation of imperial 
economies, 
for colonialism means that a significant structural element of the economic system as 
a whole is now located elsewhere, beyond the metropolis, outside of the daily life and 
existential experience of the home country, in colonies over the water whose own life 
experience and life world – very different from that of the imperial power – remain 
unknown and unimaginable for the subjects of the imperial power […]. (Jameson 
1990: 50–51) 
The European modernist novel is therefore the product of a dilemma: how to represent a 
world which is constituted by its relationship to the unknown and unimaginable other of the 
colony. The daily life of European states remains ‘radically incomplete’ because it is 
dependent on that which is geographically and ontologically outside itself (Jameson 1990: 
58). In this situation, the modernist style emerges as a response to the representational crisis 
catalysed by an imperial world-system. For Jameson, breaks in the totality of realist 
representation of the world are determined by the spatial and economic order of imperial 
states.  
In different ways, Foucault, Runia, and Jameson all challenge the naïve assertion that the 
historian represents the past to the present. For Runia and Jameson, breaks or lacunae in the 
totality of the historical narrative indicate deeper crises in the representational regimes 
determined by the social and cultural context in which the historian works. This is 
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particularly the case, as Momigliano understood, with the history of the later Roman Empire. 
Enlightenment accounts had analysed the later Roman Empire in terms of imperial decline 
from classical heights, while twentieth century historiography had slowly shifted towards 
interpreting the period as distinct in its own right. Claims defining something in relationship 
to the category of ‘the modern’ always involve a wider set of assumptions about 
representation and temporality (Cooper 2005, 149). When Brown declared, then, that there is 
something ‘modern’ about Augustine and Plotinus, he was drawing on this trajectory in the 
historiography. Braudel and Marrou were critical sources as Brown began to reframe the time 
and space of the later Roman Empire but these authors were themselves part of a wider 
debate about the nature of modernity that unfolded in France and its overseas territories 
during the early twentieth century.  
There was never a time when the French Republic was not also an imperial state. 
Fundamental to the Republic were the contradictions between republican ideals of universal 
equality and an imperial reality of material exploitation and violence. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
‘colonial humanism’ became the principal way in which French politicians, administrators, 
and academics articulated the relationship between metropolitan France and its overseas 
territories.  
In France, the professionalization of the study of human societies and cultures was a process 
intertwined with colonial government during the Third Republic (Debaene 2014: 26–27; 
Conklin 2013: 193–194). Young university disciplines asserted their scholarly bona fides by 
positioning themselves as a ‘new humanism’. This rhetorical turn evoked the scholarship of 
the Renaissance and implied a long pedigree. It also positioned the new disciplines as a check 
against the inhumane alienation that accompanied the social division of academic and 
industrial labour (Debaene 2014: 120–124). In this way, it was argued, the professional study 
of other peoples and societies could address the deleterious effects of imperial capitalism and 
hence inform a more humane (and therefore efficient) colonial policy (Wilder 2005: 49–50). 
Colonial humanism was born from the exchanges between the colonial field and the 
universities of the Métropole (Sibeud 2002: 188–189). By the 1930s, this humanism had 
suffused the Humanities, structuring academics’ analysis of societies and behaviours 
(Debaene 2014: 121–123; Reynaud Paligot 2006b: 9). This was a way of incorporating the 
time and space of the French empire into wider narratives of social evolution and progress.  
10 
 
Emerging from the intersection of Enlightenment models of civilizational progress and the 
evolutionary biology of Darwin and Lemarck (Reynaud Paligot 2006b: 2), colonial 
humanism insisted on the fundamental equality and dignity of all human beings and so 
situated itself firmly within French Republican traditions. At the same time, it deployed a 
governmental structure that denied citizenship rights to some people in some places. To 
ameliorate this contradiction, colonial humanists argued that ‘culture’ constituted the key 
difference between peoples, a racialization informed by late nineteenth-century models of 
evolution and human change (Sibeud 2002: 21; Reynaud Paligot 2006a: 33–43). It was a shift 
from biological accounts of racial difference into differentiation according to culture and a 
society’s position on a developmental axis that stretched from nomadism to nationhood 
(Hannoum 2008: 102–103). The universality of republican rights was not in question, but 
cultural differences meant that some peoples were unready to exercise effectively their rights 
of citizenship and autonomy (Wilder 2005: 124–129). This was a play between the universal 
and the particular that was common in colonial humanism (Wilder 2005: 11–15). As Carole 
Reynaud Paligot has put it:  
Le différencialisme racial légitime ainsi la politique discriminatoire mise en œuvre 
dans les colonies par les gouvernements français : l’exclusion des droits civils et 
politiques, le régime de l’indigénat, le refus de leur accorder le droit du sol, etc. […] 
Accorder droits et libertés à des peuples n’ayant pas la maturité suffisante pour en 
faire usage reviendrait à les rejeter dans la barbarie et l’anarchie … (Reynaud Paligot 
2006b: 6). 
Colonial humanism therefore advocated the worth of all cultures and peoples as it deployed a 
ruthless geography of differentiated rights, deferring the conferment of full citizenship until 
cultures were ready to assume their humane birth right. In this context, being or becoming 
‘modern’ was a way to make political claims to rights and representation (Cooper 2005: 146–
147). Championing its sensitivity to cultural difference and orientating those differences 
around a European ‘modern’, colonial humanism was an ordering of time and space and 
people. 
Histories of late antiquity are animated by a rhetoric of modernity. This is partly because, as 
Momigliano pointed out, notions of decline, rupture, and barbaric futures are also common 
ways to define modernity. Naming something as modern establishes particular temporal 
relationships between the past and the ‘now’, shaping how the past is represented in that 
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present (Cooper 2005: 149). Linear accounts of historical change function to historicise the 
past, presenting it as present only through its mediation by the historian. Despite this, breaks 
in the totality of the historical account show how History works to hide the conditions of its 
production. Brown opens The World of Late Antiquity by focussing on the imaginative life of 
his readers: the modernity of Augustine and Plotinus is defined through their relationship to a 
European present which is both sensitive and cultural. In this short passage, Brown deploys a 
very particular ordering of time, space, and people. Certain people – Augustine and Plotinus 
– are considered ‘modern’ by virtue of their relationship to European culture. Brown’s 
introduction therefore sets up some implicit isomorphic parallels between his vision of the 
late antique past and the imperial imagination of French colonial humanism. Both posit 
culture as the fundamental defining characteristic of the world they envision. Each situates 
that culture in a temporal structure that is orientated around a ‘modernity’ conceived of as 
European. In the following sections I’ll consider where this isomorophic relationship comes 
from, showing how Brown’s concept of late antiquity is indebted to previous generations of 
Francophone scholars, whose own work was conducted during the period of colonial 
humanism. Colonial humanism remains present in the spatial and temporal structures that 
shape the study of late antiquity and in the rhetoric of modernity which animates the 
discipline.  
European: Braudel’s Mediterranean in the 1930s 
The legacies of French colonialism made their way, unrecognised, into Brown’s reading, 
their presence detectable in the symptomatic slippage between the three words, ‘modern’, 
‘European’ and ‘culture’. Let me offer an example of what I mean. Brown’s book on 
Augustine was published in 1967 and The World of Late Antiquity was published in 1971 
(Brown 1967, 1971). These two books show significant differences of methodology and 
subject matter. In the 1960s Brown had been a historian of the Latin West, but in 1971 his 
focus was the eastern Empire. The key to this shift was Brown’s reading of Fernand 
Braudel’s giant work on the Mediterranean in the time of Philip II, a book which, as Brown 
says, ‘suddenly bathed the coastlines of the late antique world, endowing them […] with a 
warmth, with a concreteness and with a tenacity that seemed rooted in the long rhythms of 
the landscape itself’ (Brown 1997: 16–17). Under this inspiration, Brown presented the world 
of late antiquity as a specific space, focussed around the Mediterranean. The World of Late 
Antiquity opens with a brief account of the ways that the land and sea provided the structures 
and boundaries of life in the late Roman world (Brown 1971: 7). As Brown puts it: 
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It is the extraordinary tide of Mediterranean life that strikes us about this empire at its 
apogee in the second century AD […] One of the main problems of the period from 
200 to 700 was how to maintain, throughout a vast empire, a style of life and a culture 
based originally on a slender coastline studded with classical city states. (Brown 
1971: 11) 
Braudel’s Mediterranean became the focus of Brown’s new world. 
Braudel himself remarks that his attitude to the Mediterranean was probably a result of his 
experiences in Algeria (Braudel 1999: 493). The French colonisation of Algeria precipitated a 
transformation in the ways that the Mediterranean was imagined. What had once been 
understood as a limpid barrier dividing Europe from Africa came to be imagined ‘as an 
interval with a broader space, that of the French empire’ (Blais and Deprest 2012: 52). This 
transformation was complemented by studies of the historical past, particularly archaeology 
(Ford 2015). The Roman past of North Africa was tied to the Roman past of France and so 
the two regions could be linked by a common patrimony. French presence in North Africa 
could therefore be justified as a continuation of an ancient relationship (Lorcin 2002). 
Braudel himself noted that Henri Pirenne was a key influence on his understanding of the 
Mediterranean, but his account of the Mediterranean was also one iteration of a much longer 
tradition of French historiography, rooted in the shifting imperial imaginary (Strachan 2011; 
Braudel 1999). Brown doesn’t make very much of Braudel’s methodological reflections on 
time and geography. Rather, Braudel gave him the means to see the Mediterranean as a single 
whole.  The world of late antiquity became imaginable as a distinctive whole when Brown 
began to see the fundamental contiguity between the coastlines of the Mediterranean. This 
idea was taken from Braudel, but it had its roots in a French historiographical tradition which 
tried to articulate the historical relationship between France and its colonies in North Africa. 
The close links between colonial humanism and the ‘human sciences’ are visible in the 
historiography of late Roman North Africa produced under the Third Republic. For example, 
in his 1927 study of the impact of the Arab invasions of North Africa, Les siècles obscurs du 
Maghreb, Emile-Félix Gautier interpreted the history of late Roman and early Islamic Africa 
through the prism of cultural difference (Gautier 1927). Gautier’s work was predicated on 
dismissing the ‘local knowledge’ provided by Arab historians like Ibn Khaldun in favour of a 
more scientific analysis of the past (Hannoum 2008: 104). Romans, he said, had brought 
plenty and prosperity to North Africa because they knew how to work the land as farmers. In 
13 
 
line with a number of contemporary studies, Gautier argued that the arrival of Arabs in the 
region also meant the decline of agriculture in favour of a lifestyle of delocalised nomadism. 
This was a common motif in French accounts of the North African past (Davis 2007: 22–23). 
As Abdelmajid Hannoum has observed, however, ‘[t]he narrative of race struggle is not 
absent from such a discourse. However, it is slightly changed to introduce what one might 
call “culture struggle”’ (Hannoum 2008: 105). The differentiation of humans was 
accomplished through reference to differences of culture. 
In its focus on cultural difference as a way of explaining historical change, Gautier’s work 
fits within the wider tradition of colonial humanism. Colonial humanism rested on a number 
of presuppositions about the nature of historical change and human perfectibility (Reynaud 
Paligot 2006b). Historians drew on these wider models of progress and humanness as they 
sought to explain the events of the past and their relationship to modernity. Moreover, the 
construction of the time and space of the colony began as a specifically epistemological 
position: a denial of the validity of ‘local knowledge’ in favour of the universally applicable 
methods of the European historian (Mignolo 2002: 59). In this way, the production of History 
was enfolded into what Wilder calls ‘colonial humanism’s administrative scientific complex’ 
which guided the Third Republic (Wilder 2005: 61). Defined in its relationship to this North 
African past, sustained by the knowledge production of ethnographers, historians, 
geographers, and archaeologists, French modernity of the 1920s and 1930s was a colonial 
modernity (Hannoum 2010: 222; Mignolo 2000: 22; Quijano 2007: 172–174).  
Gautier’s analysis of the end of Roman power in North Africa had a significant impact, as 
can be seen from the extended discussion of his work in Braudel’s review of Charles-André 
Julien’s Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord. This review was published while Braudel was still 
struggling towards the central theses that would animate La Mediterranée, but it already 
shows some key elements of that later work (Daix 1995: 99). In this review, Braudel refers to 
two monographs produced by Gautier: Les siècles obscur du Maghreb and his book on 
Vandal Africa (Gautier 1932), focussing on the former. This book is particularly remarkable, 
he says, for the author’s use of cartography. For the historian, maps are ‘a difficult weapon to 
handle, but indispensable and of the first order [une arme difficile à manier mais 
indispensible et de premier ordre]’. Gautier has used them, Braudel notes, to show that the 
neat events of the Arab chronicles and the careful reasoning of Ibn Khaldun are shaped by the 
geography of the Maghreb (Braudel 1933: 42). Gautier’s careful use of maps has therefore 
revealed the extent to which the past recounted in his sources has been shaped by this 
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landscape. This, he remarks, sets Gautier’s work apart. From now on, all historical studies of 
North Africa will be defined by their relationship to this work (Braudel 1933: 42). For 
Braudel, the importance of Gautier’s study lay in the way it conjoined the events of the past 
with the locality in which they took place (Deprest 2010). Seen in this context, the histories 
produced by Ibn Khaldun and ‘les chroniqueurs arabes’ are local phenomena determined by 
local topography; in contrast, Gautier’s text produces a universal history, one which opens 
out a new future for historical studies. Braudel’s position here is epistemological: to know 
about the past, one must be able to situate that past within a wider universal account of how 
the development of particular peoples is determined by their local geography and climate. As 
commentators observe, this review shows the extent to which Braudel was already in 1933 
thinking about the close connections between geography and historical time (Gemelli 1995: 
42–44). 
In his review, Braudel sketched out the preceding forty years of scholarship, noting with 
approval Julien’s remark that ‘[l]e perfide Maghreb n’est pas moins hostile aux historiens 
qu’aux conquérants’ and proceeds to describe the work of historians as a vast project of 
mapping and conquest. Indeed, he presented his review as an attempt ‘to mark, after so much 
analytical work, the last line reached by the historical conquest in these fields [marquer, 
après tant de travaux d’analyse, la ligne dernière qu’atteint la conquète historique en ces 
domaines]’ (Braudel 1933: 37–38). This is, says Braudel, ‘an imperialism of History’ 
[imperialisme historique]. By this he means that the work of historians in North Africa runs 
alongside the wider ‘French work in North Africa’ [l’oeuvre francaise, en Afrique du Nord] 
and the History that Julien has produced tells Braudel that the French can regard their past 
activities in North Africa ‘sans remords’. The writing of History is thus a part of the wider 
apparatus of French governance:  
La conquête historique du Maghreb est bien une lutte, aussi dure que les autres, là 
contre la silence ou la rareté de nos renseignements, là contre les hésitations du 
raisonnement ou la déformation sentimentale de nos jugements. (Braudel 1933: 52–
53; Hannoum 2008: 108; emphasis added) 
Braudel’s implication in colonial humanism is present in the metaphors of conquest and 
mapping that he uses to describe the acquisition of knowledge about the past. Professional 
ambition and republicanism led the leaders of the Annales school to align themselves with the 
colonial policies of the Third Republic (Reynaud Paligot 2009: 142–143). These concerns 
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also shape Braudel’s own conception of French colonialism and are visible, for example, in 
the way he praises French engagement with indigenous communities in Algeria (Merkel 
2017: 147–148). In this review, historical knowledge is explicitly integrated in to the ‘other 
conquests’ that have shaped the economic relationships and governing structures of the 
French empire (Reynaud Paligot 2009: 142). History is a struggle to assert ‘rationality’ and 
thereby to know the past. Braudel’s review intertwines the epistemological structures of 
History – with its rationality and universal scope – with the material, economic structures of 
imperial rule. 
Braudel noted that his experiences of imprisonment during the Second World War played a 
formative role in the writing of La Mediteranée, but it is clear that the methodology of the 
book was already coalescing in the 1930s (Braudel 1999: 496). This review of Julien shows 
the ways in which the production of History was determined by its colonial context. This is 
most obvious in the way that Braudel explicitly places knowledge production alongside the 
other conquests necessary to accomplish the ‘French work’ in Algeria. This assertion carries 
with it a host of claims about the relationship of the present to the past, the nature of the 
modern, and how the past can be represented by the historian. The colonial context is also 
present in the way that the study of History is positioned as both universal and particular. It is 
universal because it is rooted in rationality, transcending the localised histories of Ibn 
Khaldun and others. But it is also particular in the way that it is focussed on the specific ways 
that different human societies are shaped by their geographical context. This dance between 
the universal and the particular is a key feature of colonial humanism (Wilder 2005: 11–15).  
This is what Brown took from Braudel: this way of conceptualising the time and space of the 
Mediterranean. As Braudel’s review of Julien indicates, however, this approach was itself 
shaped by the imperial ambitions of the Third Republic and colonial humanism. 
Culture: Henri Marrou and the development of his reading of ancient culture  
Shifts in the geographical imagination allowed Brown to conceptualise the space of late 
antiquity, but it was through the prism of culture that he could imagine its people. As one 
recent study has put it: ‘one of the defining features of this field has been its attention to 
culture. Culture stands at the productive center of the modern historiographic creation of “late 
antiquity”’ (Jacobs 2016: 266). A focus on the cultural life of late Roman people was key to 
Brown’s re-evaluation of the period. Although this methodological commitment was 
influenced by contemporary anthropology, it was also indebted to accounts of culture and 
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change produced by French academics in the 1930s. The model of culture that emerged in 
these earlier works was a product of the discourses of colonial humanism. 
Right at the beginning, Brown’s readers are told that The World of Late Antiquity is a ‘study 
of social and cultural change’ (Brown 1971: 7) and he goes on to remind them that the 
Roman Empire of around 200 was ruled ‘by an aristocracy of amazingly uniform culture, 
taste, and language’(Brown 1971: 14). This focus on culture was a key element of Brown’s 
work at this time. For example, his 1971 article ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man’ 
defines itself as an intervention in the history of ‘Late Roman culture’ (Brown 1982: 82). A 
large influence in this turn to culture was the work of Mary Douglas (Brown 1982: 93, n.164; 
Brown 2003: 2). In a later reflection, Brown also identified the work of the French historian 
Henri-Irénée Marrou as an important influence on the ways that he imagined people’s lives in 
the late Roman world. He noted that, after reading Marrou’s work, ‘[a]ncient civilisation was 
not a drained corpse, that could be briskly dragged from the stage’ (Brown 1997: 10). The 
influence of Marrou is acknowledged, for example, in an article from the early 1980s. In this 
article, Brown places the late Roman phenomenon of holy people within wider contemporary 
models of education and erudition. As he does so, he notes that Marrou has defined the late 
Roman world as ‘The Civilisation of Paideia’ (Brown 1983: 1). The cultural role played by 
paideia (education) was, for Brown, a keystone in the edifice of late antiquity that he was 
constructing in the 1980s. It is here that the influence of Marrou is most clearly detectable.  
When he analysed the functional role played by elements of late Roman culture – such as the 
Holy Man – Brown was clearly influenced by contemporary anthropologists like Douglas. 
But the turn to culture as a specific area of enquiry was, at least partially, a response to his 
reading of Marrou. Marrou’s influence was lasting, most notably in Brown’s focus on paideia 
as a keystone of late antique culture. Marrou’s model of education and culture has its roots in 
his work of the 1930s and 1940s. It is present in his monograph on Augustine, originally 
written in the 1930s and republished in late 1949. It is also fundamental to the long history of 
education that Marrou published in 1948. As Brown acknowledges, these two books helped 
him to describe and analyse the lives of people in the late Roman world. Marrou’s work, 
however, was part of a much wider debate in France about the nature of culture and 
civilisation. This debate, focussed as it was on ways to differentiate and thereby understand 
different human societies, was tightly bound into the colonial humanism of the Third 
Republic.   
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Marrou’s doctoral dissertation was produced in Italy and published in 1938 as Saint Augustin 
et la fin de la culture antique (Marrou 1938). At the beginning of the book, Marrou expanded 
the definition of the word ‘culture’ in French. He said it referred to ‘the life of the spirit’ and 
‘the intellectual aspect of a civilisation’. In this study, Augustine was the bridge between the 
late Roman world and the Medieval, for in Augustine’s writings the techniques of classical 
culture are subordinated to the needs of the Church and the future medieval world is brought 
into existence (Vessey 1998: 385). By the time the book was republished in 1949, Marrou 
had revised his reading of Augustine (Marrou 1949). He no longer saw in Augustine the end 
of the Classical and the beginning of the Medieval; now there was something distinctive that 
Augustine shared with others of his age, a common ‘life of the spirit’ that Marrou termed the 
‘culture of the Theopolis’ (Marrou 1949: 696; Vessey 1998: 389). Brown said, of reading this 
‘Retractatio’, ‘I was thrilled by the glimpse […] offered of the sheer resilience of pre-
Christian society and culture at the very moment of the triumph of the Christian Church 
within the Roman Empire’ (Brown 1997: 11).  
Marrou’s 1949 addendum to his work on Augustine is complemented by his book on 
education, which was published the year before (Marrou 1948). In the introduction to this 
book, he laid out his understanding of the importance of education: ‘everything of importance 
in our own civilization derives from [the ancient world]’. Each civilization, he continued, 
could be distinguished because it had a particular form that was unique to it: 
l’éducation est la technique collective par laquelle une société initie sa jeune 
génération aux valeurs et aux techniques qui caractérisent la vie de sa civilisation. 
L’éducation est donc une phénomène secondaire et subordonné par rapport à celle-ci 
dont, normalement, elle représente comme un résumé et une condensation (je dis 
normalement, car il existe des sociétés illogiques qui imposent à la jeunesse une 
éducation absurde sans rapport avec la vie […]) Cela suppose évidement un certain 
décalage dans le temps : il faut d’abord qu’une civilisation atteigne sa propre Forme 
avant de pouvoir engendrer l’éducation qui la reflétera. (Marrou 1948 : 17) 
For Marrou, the study of education is important because it presents to the historian a 
distillation of the central ideals that distinguish one civilisation from another. Although 
classical education came to flourish in the decades following Alexander the Great and 
Aristotle, ‘this evolution was already present from the beginning’ (‘cette évolution est donnée 
dès le début comme acquise’); the characteristic developments of Hellenistic civilisation were 
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merely the working-out of elements that had been present from the earliest stirrings of 
classical culture (Marrou 1948: 139). Marrou’s model of historical change here is 
teleological. The study of education offers a sight-line into the heart of a civilisation’s unique 
way of seeing and understanding the world. It shows the conceptual and intellectual 
structures that lie latent, only becoming visible as they’re articulated in the words of 
pedagogues. 
Differences between these conceptual and intellectual structures are what distinguish 
civilisations from each other. Thus, for example, Marrou insisted that it was incorrect to 
speak of a Roman civilisation separate from the Hellenistic world; the educational forms 
followed by the Romans were merely a continuation of those initiated in the Hellenistic, 
which indicated that they were part of the same civilisation. ‘Italy, and through her the whole 
of the Latinised West, was annexed to Hellenistic civilisation’ (‘l’Italie, puis, par elle, tout 
l’Occident latinisé, ont été annexés à l’aire de la civilisation hellénistique’) (Marrou 1948: 
140). As this common Hellenistic tradition took root, argues Marrou, so the divisions in the 
ancient world became less pronounced: 
Qu’est-ce qui fait, désormais, l’unité de ce monde grec […] ? Moins que jamais, c’est 
le sang […] ce ne peut être que le fait de communier en un même idéal, dans la même 
pensée concernant la finalité essentielle de l’homme et les moyens d’atteindre celle-ci, 
en un mot la communauté de civilisation ou, pour mieux dire, de culture. (Marrou 
1948: 144) 
Separate groups of people are now drawn together into a common civilisation that transcends 
differences of ‘blood’. In this way, he says, ‘l’hellénisme s’incorpore et s’assimile tant 
d’éléments d’origine étrangère’ (Marrou 1948: 144). Culture, as Marrou defines it here, 
carries a personalist nuance. By this he means that ‘la culture’ does not designate a particular 
form of social life – such as, say, ‘the city’ – but rather a common understanding of humanity 
and the nature of human perfection. What bound the Hellenistic and Roman world into one 
common culture, what enabled the assimilation of elements foreign to this culture, was that 
they had all received ‘la meme formation orientée à cette fin commune, – la même education’ 
(Marrou 1948: 144). This was, then, a civilisation defined by its education: the civilisation of 
paideia. 
Marrou therefore sketches out a common lineage for Hellenistic education. Coming to 
fullness in the decades after Alexander and Aristotle, it succeeded in binding together the 
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whole of the Mediterranean, integrating, through Rome, Western Europe. A shared ideal of 
humanity and its end – ‘la culture’ – transcends differences of blood between peoples. This 
history means, he says, that the study of ancient education has a particular importance for 
French people: 
si l’antiquité a fécondé tout notre tradition européenne […] c’est dans la mesure où 
leur apport créateur a été recueilli, intégré et transmis par cette tradition classique à 
laquelle la civilisation hellénistique a conféré sa Forme et dont l’éducation 
hellénistique représente la synthèse et comme la symbole. (Marrou 1948 : 142) 
Divisions of ‘blood’ can be dissolved through the careful induction of people into a common 
paideia. The European present, culture, and periodization, were the key conceptual 
touchstones for Marrou’s work on education. Brown was to develop a very different way of 
understanding culture, but he retained from Marrou this methodological centring of culture 
and periodization. 
The discussion of culture and civilisation that Marrou follows in his work of the 1930s and 
1940s parallels wider debates. The circle of French Catholics in which Marrou moved during 
this period was heavily influenced by the work of Jacques Maritain (Riché 2003: 36). In a 
series of notes written on retreat in late 1928 and early 1929, Marrou can be seen grappling 
with the relationship between contemporary French culture and his life as a Catholic (Marrou 
2006: 81–86, 89). These reflections were to lead to Marrou’s first monograph, his 
Fondements d’une culture chrétienne which was published in 1934 under the pseudonym of 
Henri Davenson (Davenson 1934). 
This book was a manifesto for the post-war generation. Marrou argued that, for those who 
had been too young to fight for France, life could offer nothing more meaningful than a life 
selling coffee in Ethiopia or copra in the South Seas (Davenson 1934: 16). At a time of 
worldwide economic depression the young men of France find themselves clasped into an 
imperial world-system rooted in the social division of labour: 
Nous sentions tout ce qu’il y avait de grand dans cette énorme machine qui a fait de 
l’humble travail un domaine aussi beau et aussi rationnellement organisé que celui de 
la géométrie grecque. Alors nous rêvions nous aussi d’avoir des lunettes d’écaille, et 
des secrétaires affairées, et de signer des télégrammes qui enverraient des cargos au 
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delà de Suez […] Jouer le jeu en pleine conscience, s’enivrer chaque jour de cette 
mystique des chiffres et de l’action. (Davenson 1934: 23) 
Central to this book is the identification of an imperial geography of capitalism that takes in 
Suez, Ethiopia, India, and the South Seas. This ‘enormous machine’ is fundamentally 
antihumane. Fondements is focussed on tracing and then resisting this machine’s pernicious 
effects. The social divisions of labour under imperial capitalism produce societies in which 
people are alienated from themselves and each other – an inhumanity that should be resisted. 
Positioning itself as an attempt to mitigate the alienation produced by capitalism, Marrou’s 
work is typical of the turn towards the ‘new humanism’ that marked French intellectual 
culture during the 1930s (Debaene 2014: 121–124). 
Marrou argues that this resistance must begin with a new way of imagining human beings 
and their place in the world. However, such a cultural renewal must also be culturally 
specific. For example, says Marrou, Gandhi seeks the renewal of India and he does it by 
subordinating his life to a Hindu metaphysics (Davenson 1934: 21–22). Marrou calls on his 
peers to follow the example of Saint Augustine, who renewed his culture by subscribing to a 
Christian metaphysics. Marrou develops in this book a notion of culture as the articulation of 
a shared intellectual spirit. This was the same definition he put forward in his later book on 
Saint Augustine. His work of the later 1930s, and its subsequent development in the five 
years after the war, begins here with this particular model of culture and civilisation.  
The roots of Marrou’s argument in this early book lie in the ethnological work of Marcel 
Mauss, whom he quotes approvingly at a couple of key points. At the opening of a discussion 
over the nature of civilisations and how they might be understood as a corporate whole 
Marrou quotes a number of lines from Mauss’s 1929 paper on the definition of civilisation 
(Davenson 1934: 69). This paper was important for Mauss, offering a synthesis of his own 
work on the fact and notion of civilisation as it applied to the analysis of human society 
(Mauss 1968). In this paper, Mauss insisted that the notion of civilisation as it was used in 
popular discourse of the 1920s (e.g., in talk of a crisis of civilisation) was an illusion 
(Fournier 2006: 259). There was no common ‘civilisation’, he argued. Instead, there were 
broad commonalities of morality and aesthetics. Particular groups of people might manifest 
this morality or aesthetic sensibility in particular ways, in differences of dress, for example. 
Behind these distinctive features, or modes, or idiosyncrasies, there lay a common way of 
seeing the world that might be termed a ‘civilisation’ (Bert 2009: 131). Social life, in its 
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material specificity, is contrasted with ‘civilisation’, which is a particular way of imagining 
the world; if civilisation is what is held in common by different peoples, then ‘[l]e domaine 
du social c’est le domaine de la modalité’ (Mauss 1968).  
This paper was part of a wider project. In the 1920s and 1930s, Mauss argued that there was 
no fundamentally superior civilisation. Instead, each society understood universal concepts, 
like the body or the gift, in culturally specific ways. While there was no one culture that was 
innately superior, Mauss said that the most stable communities were those which had 
enshrined the bonds of society in written law and citizenship, ‘freely participating in the Idea 
guiding it’ (Conklin 2013: 250–251). Mauss’s ethnology therefore argued that no culture was 
inherently superior to another, but that the codification of rights in law rendered some 
societies more stable (Wilder 2005: 66–67). This model of culture and law cohered very 
closely with colonial humanism’s own understanding of imperial rule and cultural difference. 
In Fondements d’une culture chrétienne, Marrou draws on Mauss’s 1929 essay to talk about 
the commonalities that bind different peoples together into a common civilisation. Quoting 
Mauss’s 1929 paper at length, Marrou argues that what unites civilisations, what enables their 
identification and differentiation, is not the bodily differences proposed by racial theorists 
like Gobineau, or differences of material culture. Rather, ‘ce qui donne à ces civilisations leur 
unité profonde, c’est toujours un ensemble d’idées, de croyances, senties et reçues comme 
vérité’ (Davenson 1934 : 72).  Thus, he says, one way of defining civilisations is by 
understanding them as sharing ‘une certaine doctrine sur le monde, l’homme et la vie’ 
(Davenson 1934: 73). Marrou returns to Mauss to note how this common way of viewing the 
world should be contrasted with the ways in which social rituals and material culture are 
markers of difference (Davenson 1934: 78–79). He cites the part of Mauss’s essay which 
grapples with the difference between civilisation and social life. The emergence and meaning 
of particular social phenomena are arbitrary and human beings can only endure them, Marrou 
argues, but behind this arbitrary, shifting social swirl, there remain common ways of seeing 
the world and ascribing meaning to human life (Davenson 1934: 78–79). It is this 
commonality, persisting amid the chaos, that Marrou designates ‘civilisation’. 
Reflecting on Marrou’s impact on his understanding of the later Roman world, Brown said: 
A remarkable tradition of French liberal Catholic scholars had turned their attention 
since the late 1930s to the intimate links between late classical civilization and the 
thought-forms and culture of the great Christian writers of the Patristic age. This 
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tradition gave me my first sighting of a pre-medieval Christianity, of unexpected 
warmth, richness and flexibility, and, above all, of a Christianity held at a safe 
distance from the present, by having been firmly planted back where it belonged, in 
its native, ancient soil (Brown 1997, 11). 
Brown’s work of the 1970s and 1980s drew on Marrou in the way that it focussed on the 
notion of paideia as the underlying bond that drew together the disparate social features of 
life in the late Roman world. Although Brown was to move away from Marrou’s model of 
culture, incorporating a wider variety of sources from different regions of the late ancient 
world, he retained this emphasis on the binding power of paideia. Marrou’s turn to paideia 
comes in his work of 1948 and 1949, which presented the Hellenistic world as a civilisation 
of paideia. This shift in Marrou’s work rested on much earlier forays into the question of 
culture and civilisation that emerged in France in the late 1920s. As with other contributors to 
this debate, Marrou’s engagement with the question of culture was always an attempt to think 
through the inhumane effects of a capitalist imperial economy. Marrou’s engagement in this 
debate was to come in his first monograph, which shows his debt to Mauss. There is, then, a 
clear and direct link between debates on human culture and civilisation in the Third Republic 
and the importance of ‘culture’ as an analytic category in Brown’s work of the 1970s and 
1980s.  
The Third Republic framed French culture in terms of its capacity to transcend cultural 
differences; inculcation into the republican humanism of France would ameliorate particular, 
local cultural differences. In this way, the colonial humanism of the Third Republic has close 
structural similarities to the model of Hellenistic civilisation that Marrou puts forward in his 
History of Education. Marrou’s model of education and late Roman civilisation replicated a 
colonial humanism that argued that alterity could be absorbed into the French republican 
tradition as long as the colonial subject conformed to the paideia of France. Those who did 
not carry this paideia were not part of the humanist tradition. As Marrou says, ‘it is 
remarkable that when Varro and Cicero have to translate paideia, they will choose the Latin 
word humanitas’ (Marrou 1948: 144). The inhumane effects of imperial capitalism can only 
be ameliorated through inculcation into paideia. Marrou’s texts lay out clearly the way that 
he thinks ancient education functioned. In so doing, he naturalises the imperial policies of 
France, making them seem one more example of the evolution of civilisations in the 
Mediterranean. Recognising this opens up a couple of interesting ways to work over our own 




‘Late antiquity’ is a way of imagining and representing the world. It orders the world within a 
specific matrix of time and space, combined with a particular way of evaluating human 
difference through the prism of culture. One of the unusual characteristics of this field is the 
way that representations of the late antique past in historians’ writings play, more or less 
explicitly, between the late antique and the modern. This ‘rhetoric of modernity’ has been 
noted in a number of historiographical studies but these studies locate the modernity of late 
antiquity in different places. Sometimes the field of late antiquity is modern in its refusal to 
explain social change through crisis and catastrophe. Sometimes it is modern because it 
focuses on fundamental similarities between cultures, rather than on human difference. 
Sometimes it is modern because key components of modernity are said to originate in late 
antiquity. Generally, late antiquity’s modernity is positioned as a product of the ideological 
commitments of a liberal, left-leaning academy. In all cases, the definition of ‘modern’ has 
consequences for how late antiquity is represented by the historian. 
In his account of the historian’s work, Eelco Runia uses the concept of parallel processing to 
describe the ways in which the past becomes present in the work of historians. The way that 
historians do history, their academic practice, their epistemological commitments, these are 
for Runia manifestations of wider anxieties within the society that the historian lives. The 
way that a historian imagines the past is trammelled by these contemporary anxieties which 
are displaced into their work. As Jameson argued, the development of imperial economies 
catalysed a crisis in the way that the Métropole represented itself to itself. Literary 
modernism emerged as a way to reconcile or ameliorate this crisis in representation. For 
Jameson, the colony figures as the hidden underside of modernity, an other that constitutes 
the Métropole but remains always beyond the limits of representation. This crisis of 
representation is detectable when the totality of realist representations of the world breaks 
down. One place in which this commonly happens is in the descriptions of space in the 
modernist novel. 
As Brown has noted, the emergence of late antiquity in his work was catalysed by the 
reception of two Francophone authors: Braudel and Marrou. From Braudel, Brown took a 
way of imagining space. The world of late antiquity coalesced for him around the 
Mediterranean, that area of connectivity, travel, and economic exchange. From Marrou, 
Brown took an invigorating approach to the social and cultural life of the late Roman world. 
After Marrou, there could be no lingering sense that the Roman world of the fourth and fifth 
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centuries was a slowly decaying corpse. Instead, he showed Brown that something new and 
vibrant developed in these centuries: a civilisation of paideia, the Theopolis. 
As this article has shown, the work of Braudel and Marrou is a product of a wider French 
conversation about how to imagine and govern the space and people of the French empire. 
This conversation, dubbed ‘colonial humanism’, differentiated human beings according to 
geography and culture. Brown took from Braudel an appreciation of the Mediterranean as a 
space of economic exchange and a bridge linking North Africa to Europe. As this article has 
shown, this aspect of Braudel’s work was in place in 1933, before the publication of La 
Mediteranée. Moreover, this Mediterranean imagination was intertwined with the economic 
and cultural concerns of the Third Republic. The historian laboured alongside the other 
conquerors of the Maghreb and knowledge production was enfolded into the wider orders of 
production in the Third Republic. 
Similarly, Marrou’s account of culture and civilisation was but one small part in a general 
debate over these words that unfolded in France after 1918. This debate reached a high point 
around 1930, as can be seen in the work of Mauss. Marrou’s own response to this is his 
pseudonymous 1934 book on Christian culture in which he draws on Mauss’s ethnology to 
define culture as a common metaphysics. Culture and civilisation became key analytical 
concepts for Marrou, who continued to develop them in his work of the 1930s and 1940s. In 
all cases, however, he retained this focus on common ways of knowing and giving meaning 
to the world. This model of culture reappears in his 1948 book on education, a work in which 
he argued that paideia functioned to ameliorate differences of ‘blood’. Education and culture 
were, for Marrou, a means of transcending human difference. As Mauss argued, while the 
world was made up of many civilisations, it was the republican nation state that offered the 
greatest stability to human society. In a similar way, Marrou’s account of the civilisation of 
paideia demonstrates the power of education to inculcate others with the ‘spirit’ of a 
civilisation and thereby dissolve the destabilising threat of difference. 
Brown drew on the work of Braudel and Marrou, but these men were themselves part of a 
wider project of French imperial imagining. If there is a ‘rhetoric of modernity’ operating in 
the discipline of Late Antiquity then we find it here: in the role of the colony as something 
critical to late antiquity’s formation, just as the colony was critical to the formation of the 
modernist novel. As in the modernist novel, the colony is occluded. Its presence is detectable 
when Brown situates late antiquity in relationship to ‘modern’ European culture. To put it 
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bluntly, late antiquity is modern because it was constituted in relationship with the colonial 
other, particularly Algeria. It remains modern to the extent that the constituting role of the 
colony is unacknowledged in the historiography of the field. 
This article began by observing that the study of late antiquity is marked by a reflexivity over 
periodization and topography. There are endless debates in the historiography about what late 
antiquity is, about where its boundaries lie, and how it can be known. One way of breaking 
open this impasse might be to recognise that late antiquity itself emerges from the 
contradictions of the political economy of the Third Republic. Anxieties about what late 
antiquity is, about what defines late antique culture, these are the debates of colonial 
humanism displaced into a new context. The works of historians are ideological products that 
serve to discipline the past and ameliorate the contradictions in contemporary society. 
Despite their best efforts, however, the past does not stay disciplined and confined. Rather, it 
makes its presence felt in the gaps and stumblings in our accounts of history. It peeps out at 
us between the quotation marks that engulf the ‘modern’. 
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